首页    期刊浏览 2024年07月05日 星期五
登录注册

文章基本信息

  • 标题:Game model of three-party shared risk allocation for PPP projects ---based on the perspective of incomplete information
  • 本地全文:下载
  • 作者:Peipei Zhang ; Kuo Zhan ; Ying Zhou
  • 期刊名称:IOP Conference Series: Earth and Environmental Science
  • 印刷版ISSN:1755-1307
  • 电子版ISSN:1755-1315
  • 出版年度:2019
  • 卷号:295
  • 期号:4
  • 页码:1-7
  • DOI:10.1088/1755-1315/295/4/042049
  • 出版社:IOP Publishing
  • 摘要:PPP projects involve multi-stakeholders. Rational allocation of risk among project participants is the basis and key to the smooth operation of PPP projects. In the past, most of the studies have only considered the public and private parties, but ignored the bank as the project participant to share the project risk. Therefore, using the bargaining game theory, this paper bulids a bargaining game model in which the three parties (government, enterprise and bank) of PPP project deter each other under incomplete information, and works out the corresponding sub-game refined Nash equilibrium, then obtains the proportion of risk sharing among the three participants. The research results provide a scientific basis for project participants to make decision on risk sharing, which is conducive to improving the willingness of project participants to cooperate, and also play a supplementary role in PPP project risk sharing research.
国家哲学社会科学文献中心版权所有