期刊名称：International Journal for Research in Vocational Education and Training (IJRVET)
印刷版ISSN：2197-8646
出版年度：2012
卷号：4
期号：1
出版社：European Research Network in Vocational Education and Training (VETNET), European Educational Research Association
摘要：We examine the effects of and the incentives for increasing input efficiency within a spatially segregated Cournot duopoly with monopoly trade unions whose utility functions depend on both wages and employment. We show that with neoclassical as well as Leontief technology, unions raise wages to appropriate fully the gains from labor-saving technological (or organisational) improvements, leaving the firm with no incentive to invest in increasing the efficiency of workers. However, capital-saving technological improvement may be profitable depending on the elasticity of substitution. Finally, we examine the implication of a fixed minimum wage (or competitive labor market) in one country.
