期刊名称：International Journal of Finance & Banking Studies
印刷版ISSN：2147-4486
出版年度：2015
卷号：4
期号：4
页码：44-51
DOI：10.20525/ijfbs.v4i4.39
语种：English
出版社：Society for the Study of Business & Finance
摘要：In this paper, we examine the impact of CEO power on auditor choice. We are motivated by the competing financial reporting incentives arising from CEO power. Our empirical finding suggests that powerful CEOs are more likely to hire high-quality auditors as a signal of superior financial reporting quality. We contribute to the literature of auditor switch and extend the research on the links between CEO power and firm behaviors.
其他摘要：In this paper, we examine the impact of CEO power on auditor choice. We are motivated by the competing financial reporting incentives arising from CEO power. Our empirical finding suggests that powerful CEOs are more likely to hire high-quality auditors as a signal of superior financial reporting quality. We contribute to the literature of auditor switch and extend the research on the links between CEO power and firm behaviors.
