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  • 标题:Obviously Strategyproof Mechanisms for Machine Scheduling
  • 本地全文:下载
  • 作者:Diodato Ferraioli ; Adrian Meier ; Paolo Penna
  • 期刊名称:LIPIcs : Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics
  • 电子版ISSN:1868-8969
  • 出版年度:2019
  • 卷号:144
  • 页码:1-15
  • DOI:10.4230/LIPIcs.ESA.2019.46
  • 出版社:Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum fuer Informatik
  • 摘要:Catering to the incentives of people with limited rationality is a challenging research direction that requires novel paradigms to design mechanisms and approximation algorithms. Obviously strategyproof (OSP) mechanisms have recently emerged as the concept of interest to this research agenda. However, the majority of the literature in the area has either highlighted the shortcomings of OSP or focused on the "right" definition rather than on the construction of these mechanisms. We here give the first set of tight results on the approximation guarantee of OSP mechanisms for scheduling related machines. By extending the well-known cycle monotonicity technique, we are able to concentrate on the algorithmic component of OSP mechanisms and provide some novel paradigms for their design.
  • 关键词:Bounded Rationality; Extensive-form Mechanisms; Approximate Mechanism Design
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