期刊名称：International Research Journal of Finance and Economics
印刷版ISSN：1450-2887
电子版ISSN：1450-2887
出版年度：2020
期号：177
页码：22-38
出版社：European Journals Inc.
摘要：This study examines the determinants of CEO Stock Options compensation. Stock options are defined as the aggregate value of all options granted to the executive during the year as valued by the company. The sample was carried out on 2,448 CEO’s from 1,622 firms spanning a range from 1997-2002. The determinants of CEO Stock Options compensation are international diversification, industry diversification, firm performance, investment opportunities, firm size, and stock ownership. This study employs the concept of corporate diversification as identified by Duru and Reeb (2002) and Kim, et al. (2001) that divides corporate diversification into international diversification and industrial diversification. This study is the first study to examine whether industrial diversification is negatively associated with stock options compensation. Our findings show that there is a negative significant relationship between industrial diversification and stock options compensation. The results also show that the higher the degree of international diversification, investment opportunities, and firm size, the more CEOs receive in stock options. In contrast, the higher the degree of industrial diversification, the lesser CEOs receive in stock options. CEOs that have greater outstanding stock ownership make less use of CEOs stock options.
