摘要：This essay makes a contribution towardsan Orthodox philosophy of languageby drawing on the work ofPavel Florensky and Sergei Bulgakov.Three dimensions of linguistic meaningare discussed: meaning as reference,meaning as use (the pragmaticaspect of meaning), and meaning assense. The paper argues that a onesidedemphasis on one of these dimensionsof meaning prevents theformation of a theologically convincingtheory of language. First, anaccount is given of Florensky’s discussionof ‘pure empiricism’ that anticipateslater criticisms of the logical empiricists’ theory of meaning as reference and empirical verification (ideal language philosophy). Second, the article argues that Florensky’s dialectic seeks to do justice to the pragmatic aspect of meaning, but without succumbing to a radical finitism and epistemic pessimism. Although linguistic meaning is indeed dependent on pragmatic and contextual factors, Florensky believes that language enables us to acquire real knowledge of the world. Thirdly, the paper discusses Bulgakov’s semantic realism and his Trinitarian understanding of semiosis. Through our acts of naming and predicating (‘A is B’) the Kantian abyss between noumenon and phenomenon is overcome. Predication exceeds the dichotomy of freedom and necessity, as every act of interpretation involves at once an experience of the world’s resistance and an act of creativity.
关键词：philosophy of language; Russian religious philosophy; linguistic meaning; realism; sophiology
