摘要：This paper constructs a duopoly model to study the optimal international
cross-ownership and state-owned shares proportion when domestic state-owned
enterprise competes with foreign-funded enterprise in home market or against local
enterprise in foreign market under Cournot competition. The results indicate that
whether to implement international cross-ownership or not and the proportion of
state-owned depend on the implementing subject of cross-ownership, competitive
environment, the effi ciencies of state-owned and private capitals, and so on.
The proportion of state-owned shares may infl uence the action of international
cross-ownership in some cases. Complete nationalization is optimal choice under
specifi ed condition. These conclusions have certain signifi cance for the formulation
of privatization policies in various countries and the merger and reorganization of
enterprises in the international scope.
关键词：Duopoly; Cross-ownership; optimal proportion of state-owned;
shares; social welfare; competition; cooperation.
