摘要：Monetary policy has fiscal implications that are especially
pronounced at the zero lower bound. Independent central
banks in advanced economies have considerable leeway to ease
fiscal pressures faced by governments without compromising
price stability. They also have the power to create unnecessary
fiscal problems. A fiscal squeeze can serve as an incentive
against a “misbehaving” government that appears reluctant
to adopt the structural reforms that, in the central bank’s
view, may be in the long-term interest of a country. Validating
default fears and high risk premiums on government debt can
be a potent tool to discourage what the central bank perceives
as “moral hazard.” At times, independent central banks may
be tempted to step outside their mandate and use their considerable
discretionary authority to achieve what they perceive as
better economic outcomes. How should this authority be used?
Are the limits of democratic legitimacy respected? Comparing
the recent policy records of the Bank of Japan and the European
Central Bank suggests that independent central banks
have not always managed to balance the inevitable tensions
satisfactorily.
