摘要：Budget-neutral tax wedge reductions rank high in the policy
agenda of several EMU member states. Using a New Keynesian
DSGE model of a monetary union with a search-andmatching
market structure and a fiscal bloc containing a wide
range of taxes and disaggregated government spending, we
evaluate the macroeconomic and welfare effects of reducing the
firms’ and workers’ labor tax rates under alternative financing
instruments. Overall, a tax wedge reduction is beneficial in
terms of both welfare and output. While financing the labor tax
wedge reduction by an increase in consumption taxation yields
most favorable output effects, financing it by a reduction in
government spending is more welfare enhancing, as the latter
does not imply a policy-induced increase in private consumption
costs. We also show that, when there exists an extensive
and intensive labor margin, a reduction in the workers’ and
not the firms’ burden can be most beneficial.
