期刊名称：CEMFI Working Papers / Centro de Estudios Monetarios y Financieros, Madrid
出版年度：2018
卷号：2018
页码：1-43
出版社：Centro de Estudios Monetarios y Financieros, Madrid
摘要：We analyze the effect of bank capital requirements on the structure and risk of a financial system
where markets, regulated banks, and shadow banks coexist. Banks face a moral hazard problem in
screening entrepreneurs' projects, and they choose whether to be regulated or not. If regulated, a
supervisor certifies their capital; if not, they have to rely on more expensive private certification.
Under both risk-insensitive and risk-sensitive requirements, safer entrepreneurs borrow from the
market and riskier entrepreneurs borrow from banks. But risk-insensitive (sensitive) requirements are
especially costly for relatively safe (risky) entrepreneurs, which may shift from regulated to shadow
banks.
关键词：Bank regulation; bank supervision; capital requirements; credit screening; credit spreads;
loan defaults; optimal regulation; market finance; shadow banks;
