摘要：This study analyzes the impact of corruption on the elasticity of R&D investments in sales per worker by firms. In this
sense, it built a model of Schumpeterian growth using optimal control theory relating the effects of corruption on
demand for R&D. The model results show that corruption negatively affects the R&D demand and long-term rate of
technical progress. However, this cost attributes different 'weights' as firms approach the technological frontier. To
empirically test this relationship, it was built partial order- frontiers on a sample of 2,000 firms from 40 sectors and
46 countries. Interacting efficiency scores with the corruption index, the less-efficient firms are disadvantaged with
corruption in relation to the frontier firms. This pattern is observed in the coefficient of elasticity of R&D investments
indicating that corruption leads to different costs, 'favoring' the most efficient firms in relation to the most backward
firms.
