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  • 标题:Selfish altruism, fierce cooperation and the predator
  • 本地全文:下载
  • 作者:Nikolaos Askitas
  • 期刊名称:Journal of Biological Dynamics
  • 印刷版ISSN:1751-3758
  • 电子版ISSN:1751-3766
  • 出版年度:2018
  • 卷号:12
  • 期号:1
  • 页码:471-485
  • DOI:10.1080/17513758.2018.1473645
  • 出版社:Taylor & Francis
  • 摘要:This paper suggests a new way to think about a famous question: what explains cooperation in nature and in particular in humans? I argue that, for an evolutionary biologist as well as a quantitative social scientist, the triangle of two 'teammates' in the presence of a predator (passing and shooting in two-on-one situations) is one of the fundamental conceptual building-blocks for understanding these phenomena because in such a situation the fact that life is packaged in many distinct enclosures (and not in one big monolithic blob) can unfold its comparative advantage. I show how, in the presence of a predator, cooperative equilibria emerge among entirely selfish teammates if we infinitesimally bias the lead player in the selfish direction or assign a computational burden on the predator due to the presence of a teammate. I argue that 'predators' are common in the biological jungle but also in everyday human settings. Intuitively, this paper builds on the simple idea - a familiar one to a biologist observing the natural world but perhaps less so to social scientists - that everybody has enemies.
  • 关键词:Evolutionary game theory ; fitness ; altruism ; cooperation ; decoy ; Nash equilibrium ; repeated matching-pennies game ; predator ; emergence
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