摘要：Resumen : La reforma, en 2015, de la LOTC ha supuesto importantes consecuencias jurídicas y políticas. En cuanto a las primeras se refiere, la reforma ha puesto en tela de juicio nuestro modelo de justicia constitucional así como la propia posición del Tribunal en relación con los demás poderes del Estado. Desde el punto de vista político, la reforma, aprobada precipitadamente y al final de la legislatura, esta concebida únicamente para resolver el problema soberanista catalán, situando en sede jurisdiccional decisiones políticas que nunca corresponden a un órgano de Justicia Constitucional. Como señaló la propia Comisión de Venecia, en su informe de marzo del 2017, y pese a haber sido declarada constitucional la reforma realizada, no es recomendable que estas competencias de ejecución sean atribuidas al Tribunal Constitucional. Abstract : The Spanish Constitutional Court Organization Act reform of 2015 has had significant legal and political repercussions. From a legal perspective, the reform has called into question both our constitutional justice model and the Court’s role in relation to other State powers. From a political point of view, the unwisely rush in adopting said reform at the end of the parliamentary term, was solely intended to resolve the Catalan sovereignty issue, thus placing political decisions at the hands of a Constitutional Court that should not be deciding on such matters. As pointed out by the Venice Commission itself, in its report of March 2017, and despite the reform´s constitutionality, attributing such enforcement powers to the Constitutional Court is not recommended. Summary : I. General remarks. II. Theoretical issues raised: A) The likely disruption of the Constitutional Justice model. B) The notion of Constitutional Review. C) Enforcement as a constituent element of the jurisdictional function. III. New measures for enforcing Constitutional Court decisions: A) The nature of the sentences. B) The default rules. C) The position of the Court in relation to the implementation of its decisions. D) The imposition of fines. E) Suspension of duties. F) Execution of alternative measures. G) Adoption of other necessary measures. IV. Implementation of the corresponding enforcement measures.
其他摘要：Abstract : The Spanish Constitutional Court Organization Act reform of 2015 has had significant legal and political repercussions. From a legal perspective, the reform has called into question both our constitutional justice model and the Court’s role in relation to other State powers. From a political point of view, the unwisely rush in adopting said reform at the end of the parliamentary term, was solely intended to resolve the Catalan sovereignty issue, thus placing political decisions at the hands of a Constitutional Court that should not be deciding on such matters. As pointed out by the Venice Commission itself, in its report of March 2017, and despite the reform´s constitutionality, attributing such enforcement powers to the Constitutional Court is not recommended.
关键词：Tribunal Constitucional;Control de constitucionalidad;Modelo de justicia constitucional;Ejecución de resoluciones jurisdiccionales;Constitutional Court;Constitutional review;Constitutional justice model;Enforcement of judicial decisions
其他关键词：Constitutional Court;Constitutional review;Constitutional justice model;Enforcement of judicial decisions
