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文章基本信息

  • 标题:PROTOCOL: Does executive compensation predict publicly traded firms’ financial performance or inaccurate financial reporting?
  • 本地全文:下载
  • 作者:Denise M. Rousseau ; Donna Beck ; ByeongJo Kim
  • 期刊名称:Campbell Systematic Reviews
  • 电子版ISSN:1891-1803
  • 出版年度:2019
  • 卷号:15
  • 期号:4
  • 页码:1-6
  • DOI:10.1002/cl2.1064
  • 出版社:The Campbell Collaboration
  • 摘要:Abstract This is the protocol for a Campbell review. The objectives are as follows: One goal of this systematic review is to identify whether incentive terms in CEO contracts predict firm financial performance over time; a second goal is to identify whether incentive terms in CEO contracts predict subsequent inaccurate financial reporting as manifest in restatement of accounting data due to errors or other distortions in reporting financial information.
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