摘要：I present in this text a reading of the first part (127a-135c) of the Parmenides dialogue. My purpose is to demonstrate the possibility that the criticisms objected by the old Parmenides to the Platonic hypothesis of Ideas, exposed and defended by the young Socrates, are not lethal to the same hypothesis, since they are based on two presuppositions that are extraneous and unnecessary to it. First, Parmenides' assumption that the "distinction" ( diéiresai ) between Ideas and things that participate of them is equivalent to a total "separation" ( choris ) of both ( Prm. 130b). Second, the fact that the Eleatic, in constructing his arguments, treats the Ideas as if they were material things , that is, such as the things that are objects of our sensory perception. I intend to show how these two assumptions support the theoretical difficulties arising from the questions addressed by Parmenides to Socrates, which the latter cannot answer. In the end, my suggestion is that Plato put into the mouth of the old Eleatic an erroneous interpretation of his own hypothesis of Ideas. In this sense, our Philosopher, in the Parmenides dialogue, would be fighting a certain platonism.↓I present in this text a reading of the first part (127a-135c) of the Parmenides dialogue. My purpose is to demonstrate the possibility that the criticisms objected by the old Parmenides to the Platonic hypothesis of Ideas, exposed and defended by the young Socrates, are not lethal to the same hypothesis, since they are based on two presuppositions that are extraneous and unnecessary to it. First, Parmenides' assumption that the "distinction" ( diéiresai ) between Ideas and things that participate of them is equivalent to a total "separation" ( choris ) of both ( Prm. 130b). Second, the fact that the Eleatic, in constructing his arguments, treats the Ideas as if they were material things , that is, such as the things that are objects of our sensory perception. I intend to show how these two assumptions support the theoretical difficulties arising from the questions addressed by Parmenides to Socrates, which the latter cannot answer. In the end, my suggestion is that Plato put into the mouth of the old Eleatic an erroneous interpretation of his own hypothesis of Ideas. In this sense, our Philosopher, in the Parmenides dialogue, would be fighting a certain platonism.↓I present in this text a reading of the first part (127a-135c) of the Parmenides dialogue. My purpose is to demonstrate the possibility that the criticisms objected by the old Parmenides to the Platonic hypothesis of Ideas, exposed and defended by the young Socrates, are not lethal to the same hypothesis, since they are based on two presuppositions that are extraneous and unnecessary to it. First, Parmenides' assumption that the "distinction" ( diéiresai ) between Ideas and things that participate of them is equivalent to a total "separation" ( choris ) of both ( Prm. 130b). Second, the fact that the Eleatic, in constructing his arguments, treats the Ideas as if they were material things , that is, such as the things that are objects of our sensory perception. I intend to show how these two assumptions support the theoretical difficulties arising from the questions addressed by Parmenides to Socrates, which the latter cannot answer. In the end, my suggestion is that Plato put into the mouth of the old Eleatic an erroneous interpretation of his own hypothesis of Ideas. In this sense, our Philosopher, in the Parmenides dialogue, would be fighting a certain platonism.↓I present in this text a reading of the first part (127a-135c) of the Parmenides dialogue. My purpose is to demonstrate the possibility that the criticisms objected by the old Parmenides to the Platonic hypothesis of Ideas, exposed and defended by the young Socrates, are not lethal to the same hypothesis, since they are based on two presuppositions that are extraneous and unnecessary to it. First, Parmenides' assumption that the "distinction" ( diéiresai ) between Ideas and things that participate of them is equivalent to a total "separation" ( choris ) of both ( Prm. 130b). Second, the fact that the Eleatic, in constructing his arguments, treats the Ideas as if they were material things , that is, such as the things that are objects of our sensory perception. I intend to show how these two assumptions support the theoretical difficulties arising from the questions addressed by Parmenides to Socrates, which the latter cannot answer. In the end, my suggestion is that Plato put into the mouth of the old Eleatic an erroneous interpretation of his own hypothesis of Ideas. In this sense, our Philosopher, in the Parmenides dialogue, would be fighting a certain platonism.↓Apresento nesse texto uma leitura da primeira parte (127a-135c) do diálogo Parmênides . Meu objetivo é demonstrar a possibilidade de que as críticas objetadas pelo velho Parmênides à hipótese platônica das Ideias, exposta e defendida pelo jovem Sócrates, não são letais à mesma hipótese, uma vez que estão assentadas em dois pressupostos que a ela são alheios e desnecessários. Primeiro, a pressuposição de Parmênides de que a “distinção” ( di é ir e sai ) entre Ideias e coisas delas participantes seja equivalente a total “separação” ( ch o rís ) entre ambas ( Prm. 130b). Segundo, o fato de que o Eleata, na construção de seus argumentos, trata das Ideias como se fossem coisas materiais , isto é, tais como as coisas que são objetos de nossa percepção sensível. Pretendo mostrar de que forma esses dois pressupostos sustentam as dificuldades teóricas decorrentes das perguntas dirigidas por Parmênides a Sócrates, as quais esse último não consegue responder. Ao final, minha sugestão é de que Platão tenha posto na boca do velho Eleata uma interpretação errônea de sua própria hipótese das Ideias. Nesse sentido, nosso Filósofo, no diálogo Parmênides , estaria combatendo um certo platonismo .
其他摘要：I present in this text a reading of the first part (127a-135c) of the Parmenides dialogue. My purpose is to demonstrate the possibility that the criticisms objected by the old Parmenides to the Platonic hypothesis of Ideas, exposed and defended by the young Socrates, are not lethal to the same hypothesis, since they are based on two presuppositions that are extraneous and unnecessary to it. First, Parmenides' assumption that the "distinction" ( di é ir e sai ) between Ideas and things that participate of them is equivalent to a total "separation" ( ch o ris ) of both ( Prm. 130b). Second, the fact that the Eleatic, in constructing his arguments, treats the Ideas as if they were material things , that is, such as the things that are objects of our sensory perception. I intend to show how these two assumptions support the theoretical difficulties arising from the questions addressed by Parmenides to Socrates, which the latter cannot answer. In the end, my suggestion is that Plato put into the mouth of the old Eleatic an erroneous interpretation of his own hypothesis of Ideas. In this sense, our Philosopher, in the Parmenides dialogue, would be fighting a certain platonism .
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其他关键词：Hypothesis of Ideas;Criticism;Parmenides;Plato;Platonism
