摘要：Das über die Grenzen möglicher Erfahrungserkenntnis hinausgehende Denken benötigt einen subjektiven Grund zur Legitimierung seiner Urteile. Dieser liegt nach Kant im Gefühl eines “Vernunftbedürfnisses”, das aber seinerseits (zur Unterscheidung von “un-vernünftigem” Drang) als ein solches begründet werden muss. Hierzu dient die Reklamierung eines besonderen “Recht[s] des Bedürfnisses” der Vernunft, “als eines subjectiven Grundes etwas […] anzunehmen, was sie durch objective Gründe zu wissen sich nicht anmaben darf” [08:137]. Im Unterschied zum Bedürfnis der theoretischen Vernunft und seiner Befriedigung durch blobe Hypothesen (“Urgrund”) ist das praktische Vernunftbedürfnis unbedingt, weil wir hier nicht nur “urtheilen wollen, sondern […] urtheilen müssen” [08:139]. – Die besonderen Bedingungen dieses “Müssens” – die moralischen “Postulate” – sollen im Folgenden kritisch beleuchtet werden.↓Thinking beyond the limits of possible empirical knowledge requires a subjective reason for legitimizing its judgments. According to Kant, this lies in the feeling of a "need for reason", which for its part (in contrast to "non-rational" urge) must be justified as such. For this purpose is claimed a special "right of the need" of reason, as a “subjective reason to assume something [...] which it may not presume to know by objective reasons" [08:137]. In contrast to the need of theoretical reason and its satisfaction by mere hypotheses ("original reason"), the practical need of reason is unconditional, because here we do not only "want to judge, but must [...] judge" [08:139]. - The special conditions of this "must" - the moral "postulates" - are to be critically examined in the following.↓Thinking beyond the limits of possible empirical knowledge requires a subjective reason for legitimizing its judgments. According to Kant, this lies in the feeling of a "need for reason", which for its part (in contrast to "non-rational" urge) must be justified as such. For this purpose is claimed a special "right of the need" of reason, as a “subjective reason to assume something [...] which it may not presume to know by objective reasons" [08:137]. In contrast to the need of theoretical reason and its satisfaction by mere hypotheses ("original reason"), the practical need of reason is unconditional, because here we do not only "want to judge, but must [...] judge" [08:139]. - The special conditions of this "must" - the moral "postulates" - are to be critically examined in the following.↓Thinking beyond the limits of possible empirical knowledge requires a subjective reason for legitimizing its judgments. According to Kant, this lies in the feeling of a "need for reason", which for its part (in contrast to "non-rational" urge) must be justified as such. For this purpose is claimed a special "right of the need" of reason, as a “subjective reason to assume something [...] which it may not presume to know by objective reasons" [08:137]. In contrast to the need of theoretical reason and its satisfaction by mere hypotheses ("original reason"), the practical need of reason is unconditional, because here we do not only "want to judge, but must [...] judge" [08:139]. - The special conditions of this "must" - the moral "postulates" - are to be critically examined in the following.↓Pensar além dos limites do possível conhecimento empírico requer uma razão subjetiva para legitimar seus juízos. De acordo com Kant, esta reside no sentimento de uma "necessidade da razão", que, por sua vez (para distingui-la de impulsos "não-racionais"), deve ser justificado como tal. Para isto, é reclamado um especial "direito da necessidade" da razão, como “fundamento subjetivo para supor e admitir algo [...] que ela com fundamento objetivo não pode presumir saber" [08:137]. Ao contrário da necessidade da razão teórica e da sua satisfação por meras hipóteses ("causa originária"), a necessidade prática da razão é incondicional, porque aqui não só "queremos julgar, mas devemos [...] julgar" [08:139]. – A seguir, as condições específicas deste "dever" - os "postulados" morais – serão examinadas criticamente.
其他摘要：Thinking beyond the limits of possible empirical knowledge requires a subjective reason for legitimizing its judgments. According to Kant, this lies in the feeling of a "need for reason", which for its part (in contrast to "non-rational" urge) must be justified as such. For this purpose is claimed a special "right of the need" of reason, as a “subjective reason to assume something [...] which it may not presume to know by objective reasons" [08:137]. In contrast to the need of theoretical reason and its satisfaction by mere hypotheses ("original reason"), the practical need of reason is unconditional, because here we do not only "want to judge, but must [...] judge" [08:139]. - The special conditions of this "must" - the moral "postulates" - are to be critically examined in the following.
关键词：Vernunftbedürfnis;Subjektiver Grund;Objektive Gründe;Moralische Postulate;Needs of reason;Subjective;objective reason;Moral postulates;Needs of reason;Subjective;objective reason;Moral postulates;Needs of reason;Subjective;objective reason;Moral postulates;Necessidades da razão;Fundamento subjetivo;objetivo;Postulados morais
其他关键词：Needs of reason;Subjective/objective reason;Moral postulates
