摘要：This study examines whether the executive turnover and the executive resignation during the term of office affect the performance of Korean state–owned enterprises.The executive turnover in the paper means the comprehensive change of the executives which includes the change after the term of office,the change after consecutive terms and the change during the term of office.The 'resignation’ was named for the executive change during the term of office to distinguish from the executive turnover.The study scope of the paper is restrained to the comprehensive executive change itself irrespective of the term of office and the resignation during the term of office.Therefore the natural change of the executive after the term of office or the change after consecutive terms is not included in the study.Spontaneous resignation and forced resignation are not distinguished in the paper as the distinction between the two is not easy.The paper uses both the margin of return on asset and the margin of return on asset adjusted by industry as proxies of the performance of state–owned enterprises.The business nature of state–owned enterprise is considered in the study,the public nature not in it.The paper uses the five year (2004 to 2008) samples of 24 firms designated as public enterprises by Korean government.The analysis results are as follows.First,45.1% of CEOs were changed a year during the sample period on the average.The average tenure period of CEOs was 2 years and 3 months and 49.9% among the changed CEOs resigned during the term of office.41.6% of internal auditors were changed a year on the average.The average tenure period of internal auditors was 2 years and 2 months and 51.0% among the changed internal auditors resigned during the term of office.In case of outside directors,on average,38.2% were changed a year.The average tenure period was 2 years and 7 months and 25.4% among the changed internal directors resigned during the term of office.These statistics show that numerous CEOs resigned before the finish of the three year term in office.Also,considering the tenure of an internal auditor and an outside director which diminished from 3 years to 2 years by an Act on the Management of Public Institutions (applied to the executives appointed since April 2007),it seems most internal auditors resigned during the term of office but most outside directors resigned after the end of the term.Secondly,There was no evidence that the executives were changed during the term of office because of the bad performance of prior year.On the other hand,contrary to the normal expectation,the performance of prior year of the state–owned enterprise where an outside director resigned during the term of office was significantly higher than that of other state–owned enterprises.It means that the clauses in related laws on the executive dismissal on grounds of bad performance did not work normally.Instead it can be said that the executive change was made by non–economic reasons such as a political motivation.Thirdly,the results from a fixed effect model show there were evidences that performance turned negatively when CEOs or outside directors resigned during the term of office.CEO’s resignation during the term of office gave a significantly negative effect on the margin of return on asset.Outside director’s resignation during the term of office lowered significantly the margin of return on asset adjusted by industry.These results suggest that the executive’s change in Korean state–owned enterprises was not made by objective or economic standards such as management performance assessment and the negative effect on performance of the enterprises was had by the unfaithful obeyance of the legal executive term.
其他摘要：본 연구는 정부가 공기업으로 지정한 24개 기관의 2004년부터 2008년까지의 자료를 대 상으로 공기업의 임원교체와 중도퇴임이 경영성과에 미치는 영향을 분석하였다.경영성과의 대리변수로 총자산수익률의 변화 및 산업조정 총자산수익률의 변화를 사용하였다.본 연구 는 공기업의 공공성은 배제하고 기업성만을 대상으로 분석하였으며,분석 결과 다음의 사항 이 발견되었다.첫째,매년 평균 45.1%의 CEO가 교체되었으며,CEO의 평균 재임기간은 2 년 3개월이었고 교체된 CEO 중 절반인 49.9%의 인사가 임기를 마치지 못하고 중도퇴임하 였다.감사의 경우 매년 평균 46.1%의 인사가 교체되었으며,평균 재임기간은 2년 2개월이 고,교체 인사 중 중도퇴임한 인사는 51.0%였다.비상임이사의 경우 매년 38.2%의 인사가 교체되었으며,평균 재임기간은 2년 7개월이고,교체 인사 중 25.4%가 중도퇴임하였다.CEO 는 3년 임기를 마치지 못하고 중도퇴임한 사례가 많으며,감사와 비상임이사의 경우 ｢공공 기관의운영에관한법률｣에 의해 임기가 3년에서 2년으로 줄어든 (2007년 4월 이후 취임 인사 부터 적용) 것을 감안하면 상당수 감사가 임기 도중 퇴임하였고,비상임이사는 대체로 임기 를 마친 것으로 여겨진다.둘째,전년도 경영성과 부진을 이유로 공기업 임원이 교체되거나 중도퇴임하는 통계적 증거를 찾지 못했다.오히려 예상과 달리 비상임이사가 중도퇴임한 공 기업의 전년도 경영성과가 그렇지 않은 공기업의 경영성과보다 통계적으로 유의하게 높은 현상이 발견되었다.이는 ｢공공기관의운영에관한법률｣ 또는 과거 ｢정부투자기관관리기본법｣ 등에서 경영실적 부진 등을 사유로 해임하는 해임 관련 규정이 정상적으로 작동되지 않고,정치적 동기 등 비경제적 요인에 의해 교체되고 있음을 의미한다.셋째,고정효과모형에 의 한 분석 결과,공기업 CEO와 비상임이사가 임기 종료 이전에 중도퇴임할 경우 경영성과에 부정적 영향을 미치는 증거가 발견되었다.CEO의 중도퇴임은 총자산수익률 변화에 유의한 부 (–)의 영향을 미쳤고,비상임이사의 경우 중도퇴임은 산업조정 총자산수익률 변화에 유의 한 부 (–)의 영향을 미쳤다.넷째,高성장 더미변수를 추가하여 분석한 결과,고성장 더미변 수는 경영성과에 대체로 정 (+)의 영향을 미침을 확인하였다.그러나 고성장 공기업의 CEO 가 교체되거나 중도퇴임하는 경우 고성장 더미변수의 효과는 상쇄되며 총자산수익률과 산업 조정 총자산수익률 모두가 유의하게 감소하였다.본 논문을 통해 공기업 경영실적평가 등 객관적이고 경제적인 기준에 의해 임원을 교체하지 않고,임원의 법정 임기가 충실히 지켜 지지 않아 경영성과에 부정적 영향을 미침을 알 수 있다.
关键词：(State–Owned Enterprise);(Performance);(Executive Turnover);(Executive Resignation During Term of Office);(Corporate Governance)
