出版社：LLC “Consulting Publishing Company “Business Perspectives”
摘要：This study presents an analysis on how the board leadership affects the sensitivity of CEO turnover to REIT performance and also explores other determinants of REIT CEO turnover.The results show that the sensitivity of the REIT performance-CEO turnover relation is lower when the CEO chairs the board.In addition,the analysis shows an average CEO turnover for REITs of 6.23%;which is significantly lower than the 16.5% experienced by non-REITs in the same period.These findings suggest that the lack of independent leadership in the board facilitates REIT CEO entrenchment. Finally,this study also shows that the passage of the Sarbanes Oxley Act(SOX),the percentage of outside directors in the board,and other firm and CEO characteristics such as firm size,CEO age,and tenure do not seem to affect REIT CEO turnover.
