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  • 标题:The effects of managerial ownership,leverage, dividend policy in minimizing agency problem
  • 本地全文:下载
  • 作者:Alni Rahmawati ; M.Moeljadi ; Djumahir
  • 期刊名称:Investment Management & Financial Innovations
  • 印刷版ISSN:1810-4967
  • 电子版ISSN:1812-9358
  • 出版年度:2018
  • 卷号:15
  • 期号:4
  • 页码:273-282
  • DOI:10.21511/imfi.15(4).2018.22
  • 语种:English
  • 出版社:LLC “Consulting Publishing Company “Business Perspectives”
  • 摘要:The research intends to minimize agency conflict through causality effects of managerial ownership,leverage,and dividend policy,where agency conflict is still interesting issue to discuss,as it concerns the principals'and agents'interests.The research cov?ers 33 go-public manufacturers in Indonesia Stock Exchange.It involves 198 samples in the period 2010–2015.It applies saturation sampling and balanced panel data.For analysis model,it applies Granger bidirectional/simultaneity analysis,with variables of managerial ownership,leverage and dividend policy.The research shows that:1) there is no bidirectional causality between managerial ownership and leverage(5%);2) there is no bidirectional causality between managerial ownership and dividend policy (5%);3)there is no bidirectional causality between leverage and dividend policy(10%).
  • 关键词:managerial ownership;leverage;dividend policy
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