摘要：act The extent of stock option remuneration for executives has been strongly criticized due to numerous cases of balance sheet manipulation in the USA.The (complete) incentive compatibility of executive remuneration using stock options to the market value of the company is still a controversy.This paper contributes to the criticism with a comparison between executive remuneration in companies that have manipulated their balance sheets and a control group.As a result,CEOs of companies manipulating their balance sheets in the sample received (in absolute and relative terms) significantly more stock options than in the selected control group.When controlling for age,size,and risk as potentially confounding factors,a strong interrelation with absolute amount of stock option remuneration remains,while the interrelation to the relative amount can largely be explained by the confounding factors.Furthermore,fixed salaries tended to be lower in manipulating companies.
关键词：act The extent of stock option remuneration for executives has been strongly criticized due to numerous cases of balance sheet manipulation in the USA.The (complete) incentive compatibility of executive remuneration using stock options to the market value of the company is still a controversy.This paper contributes to the criticism with a comparison between executive remuneration in companies that have manipulated their balance sheets and a control group.As a result,CEOs of companies manipulating their balance sheets in the sample received (in absolute and relative terms) significantly more stock options than in the selected control group.When controlling for age,size,and risk as potentially confounding factors,a strong interrelation with absolute amount of stock option remuneration remains,while the interrelation to the relative amount can largely be explained by the confounding factors.Furthermore,fixed salaries tended to be lower in manipulating companies.
