摘要：In this paper,I focus on the link between Husserl and Classical German Philosophy on the concept of reality.The aim of my study is this: explore the phenomenological concept of reality and strengthen the phenomenological standpoint within the contemporary discussion about «realism».After trying to outline a general characterization of «reality»,I extract the core question of Kant's approach of this perspective,namely: how is it possible to legitimate the possibility of reality thanks to a priori forms of understanding? The phenomenological answer is prepared by developing the very essence of Fichte's and Schelling's discussion on transcendental idealism,on the one hand,and a response to Meillassoux's critique of «correlationism»,on the other.The heart of my demonstration consists then in the attempt to show that the transcendental constitution of reality — that entails a «new ontology» (Levinas),characterized both by the «constitution of consciousness» and the «foundation of being» — leans on Husserl's conception of truth,and especially on the link between the determination of reality and the apprehension of truth.Furthermore,it brings into play a mediation in which the real determinations of the constituted being have themselves an effect on this transcendental constitution;and it implies that the legitimation of this mediation is based on a transcendental («reflexible») reduplication that makes the possibilisation itself possible.Thus,the concept of reality contains a legitimation of necessity that recurs both to Schelling and to Fichte (whose influences on Husserl's phenomenology are obviously systematical rather than historical).
其他摘要：В данной статье я фокусирую своё внимание на взаимосвязи между Гуссерлем и классической немецкой философией в осмыслении концепции реальности.Цель моего исследования — выявить феноменологический концепт реальности и укрепить феноменологическую позицию в к
