摘要：The first part of this papertries to contribute to the illustration of the unadequacy of objectivist epistemology,using the examples of Euclidean and hyperbolic (a type of non-Euclidean) spaces. The text shows thatreality (e. g. the objects of our scientific interest) can be perceived from more than one frame of reference. It describes the fact that what we can see is in every case influenced just by the necessary presence of a chosen frame ofreference. From the internal point of view (from the pure relation between the percieved object and the particular frame of reference),the objects percieved from the standpoints of different frames of reference are qualitatively equivalent,internaly coherent,therefore only external criteria can decide on the choice of one particularframe. The second part of present papertries to illustrate what kind of these external criteria should be taken into account in case of linguistics. It is argued here forthe important general idea: To find reliable external criteria,linguistics should make the so-called cognitive commitment. That means that in the case where there is more than one reliable parallel decription of the same particular field of interest (or its part),the only trustworthy and therefore preferred frame of reference is that one,which is consistent with our knowledge from the field of psychological/neurophysiological language processing and brain function..
