标题：Risk Taking, Principal Agent Problems and Breakdown of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR): How to Reestablish Safe-Assets and Capital Funding for Social Security?
期刊名称：Equilibrium. Quarterly Journal of Economics and Economic Policy
印刷版ISSN：1689-765X
电子版ISSN：2353-3293
出版年度：2013
卷号：8
期号：2
页码：7-30
DOI：10.12775/EQUIL.2013.011
语种：English
出版社：Institute of Economic Research
摘要：The breakdown of the financial markets in fall 2007 and the following debt crisis in the EU has produced an enormous mistrust in financial products and the monetary system. The paper describes the background of the crisis induced by functional failures in risk management and the multifold principal agent problems existing in the financial market structures. The innovated nontransparent financial products have mixed up different risk weights and puzzled, or even fooled formerly loyal customers. Contemporaneously abundant liquidity on the international finan cial market accompanied by easy money policies of the Fed in the US and the ECB in the euro zone have depressed the real interest rate to zero or even negative val ues. Desperate investors are seeking for safe-assets, but their demand remains un_x005f?satisfied. Low real interest rates and the consequently lacking compound interest effect in the same time jeopardize private as well as public insurance schemes being dependent on capital funding: the demographic crisis becomes gloomy. Therefore, the managers of the financial markets have to reestablish CSR and to divide the markets into safe-asset areas for the usual clients and “casino” areas for those who like to play with high risks. Only with transparency and risk adequate financial products can the lost commitment be regained.
关键词：Capital funding; corporate social responsibility; financial markets; principal agent problems; risk management
