摘要：This paper aims to present a theoretical concept that allows to investigate decision-making in large and ideologically differentiated bodies. Former models of oceanic games were based on the assumption of equal disposition to cooperate with other players among all voters. It is impossible to hold this assumption in a political reality. The paper develops the concept of "hybrid power indices" for oceanic games. Oceanic games with a partial homogeneity structure are analysed in the paper. The paper is the result of my previous studies of decision-making processes in large assemblies and my efforts in modelling ideological differentiation in political bodies. The paper also shows that presented formal models have solid foundations in classical sociological theories. The last part presents several convenient and reliable sociological interpretations of the models as well as my plans for future studies using the models described.
其他摘要：Zasadniczym celem artykułu jest przedstawienie koncepcji teoretycznej, umożliwiającej uwzględnienie zróżnicowania ideologicznego w zgromadzeniu z bardzo dużą liczbą głosujących. Przy analizie realiów politycznych nie do utrzymania jest bowiem przyjmowany
关键词：weighted voting game; oceanic game; partial homogeneity structure; Shapley value; hybrid power index
其他关键词：ważona gra większości; gra oceaniczna; struktura cząstkowej jednolitości; wartość Shapleya; hybrydowy indeks siły
