出版社：Institute of Philosophy of the Slovak Academy of Sciences
摘要：The problem o f the meaning o f a reasonable natural language expression is solved. First traditional "denotational" approach is criticized. The meaning o f a sentence is not its truth value,similarly the meaning of,eg,"The president o f U.S.A." is not Bill Clinton,etc. Frege met this problem when analyzing the so called propositional attitudes in which "denotational" approach has lead t o the paradox o f analysis. His wellknown solution consists in splitting the meaning into sense and reference. But this is rejected in the paper a s well,for its radical contextualism. In the first attempt,meaning is defined a s an intension — mapping from possible worlds and time points — (empirical expressions) o r extension (analytical expressions),respectively. The problem o f the propositional attitudes is seemingly solved. The proposition that Morning Star = Evening Star is different than that o f Morning Star = Morning Star. But,alas,in the case o f analytical expressionsw e get the paradox o f omniscience. A finegrained solution is,therefore,proposed: the meaning is a closed construction denoted by the respective expression. Yet this solution is still not precise enough. Eventually the meaning is a concept which is the equivalence class o f quasiidentical constructions indiscernible from the conceptual point o f view. Finally,homonymous,synonymous and (analytically and empirically) equivalent expressions are precisely defined. Concluding w e state that only synonymous expressions,having exactly the same meaning,ie. representing one and the same concept,can b e mutually substituted in propositional attitudes without leading t o paradoxes.
