出版社：Institute of Philosophy of the Slovak Academy of Sciences
摘要：The paper is based on transparent intensional logic. A sentence denotes a proposition (i.e.,a function associating possible worlds and time points with truth-values) and expresses a construction in the sense of Tichý's definition (reproduced in the paper). 'Belief sentences' refer to an attitude o f some individual to the sense of the dependent clause,i.e.,to the respective construction,which eliminates such problems as 'paradox o f omniscience'. In the case of empirical dependent clauses we can observe that at least besides this relation to a construction one can define a relation o f the subject to the state-of-affairs,represented by a proposition,i.e.,by the denotation of the sentence. To stipulate such a kind of attitudes is justified by such cases where X says that (s)he believes that Chicago is smaller than Prague and Y refers to this X's belief saying that X believes that Prague is larger than Chicago.
