出版社：Institute of Philosophy of the Slovak Academy of Sciences
摘要：From the early history of philosophy there exist conflicting sets of philosophical doctrines – realism and antirealism. Each of these is not a single thesis but rather a diverse family of positions. Realism typically insists on the independence of an item X from our conceptual apparatus,language or scientific theories,whereas antirealism affirms X’s dependence. These conflicting positions had been discussed in many of the areas of philosophy (e.g. metaphysics,ethics,philosophy of mathematics,etc.) and they persist in philosophy hitherto. Knowing the history of philosophical thought,one can even think that the dispute cannot be resolved. It has been occasionally asserted that the realism/antirealism dispute is a kind of Kantian antinomy with the consequence that being a realist or an antirealist can be therefore seen more as a matter of decision (not of solvability). The question of the nature and plausibility of realism/anti-realism is so controversial that no brief account of it will satisfy all those with a stake in the debates between realists and antirealists (see Miller 2012).
