出版社：Institute of Philosophy of the Slovak Academy of Sciences
摘要：John MacFarlane argues against objectivism about “tasty”/“not tasty” in the following way.If objectivism were true then,given that speakers use “tasty”/“not tasty” in accordance with a rule,TP,speakers would be using an evidently unreliable method to form judgements and make claims about what is tasty.Since this is implausible,objectivism must be false.In this paper,I describe a context in which speakers deviate from TP.I argue that MacFarlane’s argument against objectivism fails when applied to uses of “not tasty” within this context.So objectivism about “not tasty” is still a viable position within this context.
关键词：MacFarlane;objectivism;predicates of personal taste;relativism;sociology.
