摘要：In recent social philosophical investigation, many theorists have relied on the idea that our social and epistemic dispositions depend on collective access to a shared set of concepts, or what I call a conceptual resource. What is not said in this literature is how such conceptual resources are individuated. To address this, I propose and provide an answer to The Resource Question : What is the relationship that must hold in order for a set of concepts to be the conceptual resource of a group of people? This question implies that a conceptual resource is not defined simply by the concepts that constitute it, nor solely by the group that it is attributed to. Instead, it is defined by a relationship between groups of people and sets of concepts. After surveying some possible answers, I settle on Communication : social agents must be able to use concepts in patterned interactions of communication. This answer controverts the intuitive position that social groups are bearers of conceptual resources. I argue that conceptual resources are only indirectly related to social groups.
