摘要：Moderate epistemic akrasia is the state a subject is in when she believes that p and suspends judgment about whether her evidence supports p. In this article it is argued that, given a certain understanding of the attitude of suspension of judgment, moderate epistemic akrasia is doxastically irrational. The paper starts with a brief introduction that makes explicit some background notions and clarifies the dialectics of the debate. Second, the well-known distinction between propositional and doxastic rationality is introduced and some cases of improper basing are discussed (Turri 2011). Third, two different cases are considered in which one might argue that moderate epistemic akrasia is doxastically rational, and it is argued that none is successful. Fourth, several objections are presented and answered. Finally, some conclusions are drawn.
关键词：suspensión del juicio;evidencia de segundo orden;racionalidad doxástica;racionalidad proposicional;relación de fundación epistémica
其他关键词：suspension of judgment;higher-order evidence;doxastic rationality;propositional rationality;epistemic basing relation
