摘要：In this paper, we analyze the nature of cooperation in different corruption regimes.In a laboratory experiment with university students in Mexico, individuals play first a corruption game and then a public goods game.The corruption game is divided into three groups: high- and low-monitoring scenarios as well as a control group not exposed to the game.The public goods game is divided into three groups: the standard game, a game with centralized punishment executed by an exogenously assigned leader, and a game similar to the second one, but adding the possibility of counter-punishment.There are four key results.First, there is more corruption in the low-monitoring group.Second, in the public goods game there is less cooperation in the low-monitoring group than in the group with more intensive monitoring.Third, the option of punishment increases cooperation, but the sensitivity to punishment is greater in the high-monitoring (low-corruption) group.Fourth, the option of counter-punishment of the leader decreases cooperation.Our results highlight the importance of corruption in decreasing trust and social capital and show the diffi- culty of promoting cooperation when corruption is prevalent.
关键词：Corruption Cooperation Leader Public goods Laboratory experiment Ele
