摘要：This article provides an overview of theoretical models of acquisitions, along with conclusions relating to disciplining role of joint-stock companies’ buy-outs. If itis true that the "stowaway" problem makes acquisitions unprofitable, disciplining role of buy-outs may be challenged. This study presents static and dynamic models of acquisitions, which allow to theoretically explain the distribution of profits between shareholders of a company to be bought out and the buyer. Static models have contributed to understanding of the process of buying out joint-stock companies, but have not allowed do draw unequivocal conclusions concerning the effectiveness of acquisitions as an instrument of disciplining managers. Dynamic models have become a substantial supplement to that analysis. In a dynamic approach, the "stowaway" problem becomes much more acute due to the possibility of placing many offers to buy, hence the amount of profits for the buyer is limited. This means that the disciplining role of acquisitions may be seriously curtailed.
