摘要：A common tendency across Europe is the increased use of so-called «active conditionalities» when granting welfare benefits. «Active conditionalities» means that receipt of a welfare benefit is conditioned on the claimant performing some prescribed activity – such as work (workfare), active job search, or pursuing education or «activation» courses during daytime. Activation requirements are often presented as empowering devices, i.e. as ways to enhance the human capital of the claimant. The flip side of active requirements, however, is the implementation of what we label «sanctioning regimes», directed toward claimants who fail to fulfil, or maintain, the prescribed activity. We argue that most sanctioning regimes comprise three elements: a system for registering and transmitting information with regard to compliance/non-compliance, a system for issuing warnings, and a system for implementing sanctions. Using Norway as a case study, we show that sanctioning regimes differ from one welfare benefit to the next; they are not all equally formally institutionalized, their level of complexity varies, and the amount of discretion awarded middle managers, street-level administrators, social workers, teachers and employers varies as regards how to report non-compliance, issue warnings, and implement sanctions. Knowledge about how sanctioning regimes are designed and operate is important both from a theoretical and practical perspective, and we suggest some avenues for further research.
