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文章基本信息

  • 标题:Mechanisms for House Allocation with Existing Tenants under Dichotomous Preferences
  • 本地全文:下载
  • 作者:Haris Aziz
  • 期刊名称:Journal of Mechanism and Institution Design
  • 印刷版ISSN:2399-844X
  • 电子版ISSN:2399-8458
  • 出版年度:2018
  • 卷号:3
  • 期号:1
  • 页码:97-110
  • DOI:10.22574/jmid.2018.12.004
  • 摘要:We consider house allocation with existing tenants in which each agent has dichotomous preferences. We present strategyproof, polynomial-time, and (strongly) individually rational algorithms that satisfy the maximum number of agents. For the endowment only model, one of the algorithms also returns a core-stable allocation.
  • 关键词:House allocation; core; dichotomous preferences.
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