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文章基本信息

  • 标题:A Reexamination of the Coase Theorem
  • 本地全文:下载
  • 作者:Jingang Zhao
  • 期刊名称:Journal of Mechanism and Institution Design
  • 印刷版ISSN:2399-844X
  • 电子版ISSN:2399-8458
  • 出版年度:2018
  • 卷号:3
  • 期号:1
  • 页码:111-132
  • DOI:10.22574/jmid.2018.12.005
  • 摘要:This paper makes three advances: 1) It fixes the empty-core problem of the Coase theorem; 2) it provides the smallest upper bound of transaction costs below which the optimal or efficient outcomes can be achieved; and 3) it establishes two mathematical theorems that capture the main insights and major aspects of the Coase theorem. A simpler version of the theorems says that in a coalitional production economy without transaction costs, the maximal payoff will be produced by the optimal firms and be allocated in the always non-empty core.
  • 关键词:Coalition formation; core; optimal firms.
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