摘要：Indonesia's success at the World Trade Organization (WTO) in demanding the European Union (EU) to drop its biodiesel anti-dumping policy in 2018, as well as EU’s compliance with the decision, is a unique case when faced with the perception that international institutions tend to be inclined towards developed countries and disadvantaging developing countries. Utilizing Robert O. Keohane's liberal institutional functionalism theory, this paper describes how the WTO acted as a facilitator in resolving biodiesel disputes between the two parties. This paper argues that the WTO not only provides a dispute settlement mechanism and helps balance information biases, but also raises the cost of reputation and credibility that EU must pay if it chooses to defect the ruling. This research is not intended to show that the WTO, or international institutions and regimes in general, is an antidote for any disputes between developed and developing countries, or that it can always successfully mediate disputes between countries in general. Instead, this paper shows that international institutions can provide a platform for developing countries when facing developed countries, as long as the said actor acts rationally and makes careful calculations about its bargaining position and possible steps to be taken by its opponent.
关键词：WTO; European Union; Indonesia; anti dumping; liberal institutions; international regime; biodiesel.
