摘要：One could be forgiven for thinking that constitutional review by the judiciary is invariably part of modern constitutionalism. Gone are the days that constitutions contained provisions that prevented the courts from testing the constitutionality of legislation, such as section 59 of South Africa's now repealed Constitution of 1961 that forbade the courts from inquiring into or pronouncing on the validity of legislation. It has come to be accepted in many quarters that a constitution presupposes judicial review in some form or another in gauging the integrity of legislation, instead of only relying on legislative wisdom as before. An attitude that echoes the views expressed in Marbury v. Madison by Chief Justice Marshall of the United States Supreme Court, that by its very nature a written constitution implies judicial control. However, the Constitution of the Netherlands proves to be an exception in this regard, as section 120 states emphatically that: The constitutionality of Acts of Parliament and treaties shall not be reviewed by the courts.
