摘要：In the last third of the 20th century, there was an insistence on the usefulness and theoretical performance of embracing legal rules in terms of reasons. A subgroup of legal theorists considers that the notion of reason, on the one hand, gives an explanatory dimension to the practical phenomenon of law and, on the other hand, that this notion is conceptually paramount in relation to the rule. In this context, this article aims to demonstrate that theorists who maintain the need to assume reasons or the need to find reasons have incurred a non sequitur fallacy with respect to their theoretical assumptions. To this end, it is intended to argue that, although it may be true that the notion of reason constitutes a central category for the analysis of legal rules, unjustified conclusions were drawn from it. It will also be argued that this determined the revitalization of an old assumption, contrary to the spirit of classical juspositivism: the idea of the rational legislator. It is intended to demonstrate that those who took this unjustified leap confused the notion of reason necessary to interpret a language with the idea of practical reason.
关键词：Filosofi a do Direito; Teoria do Direito; Processo Legislativo; Normas Jurídicas; Filosofi a da Linguagem;
