摘要：Empirical Research Shows that Corporate executives usually use discretionary accruals to Earnings management that can maximize your bonus formations. On the other hand, these results is Show Impact of the monitoring process on reducing earnings management. But past research Leave a response this fundamental question that Managers learn how Methods of Earnings Management and how they adjust their actions against Monitoring approaches? It is expected this behavior, Achieved Implicitly and over time, that's it say tacit knowledge. The purpose of this research, is Survey the Effects of Tacit Knowledge on Earnings Management Behavior at Different Levels of Monitoring. This research is being conducted in the field of positive research and the method of this research is experimental (using controlled environment). In the test plan mentioned above, considered monitoring through internal audit. For this purpose, a scenario for the subjects has been designed. The research results show that Reduce the probability of Earnings management in the event of monitoring for people with higher tacit knowledge, But no significant effect was observed for people with less tacit knowledge.
