摘要："Churchâs thesis" (CT) as an axiom in constructive logic states that every total function of type â". â' â". is computable, i.e. definable in a model of computation. CT is inconsistent both in classical mathematics and in Brouwerâs intuitionism since it contradicts weak KÅ'nigâs lemma and the fan theorem, respectively. Recently, CT was proved consistent for (univalent) constructive type theory. Since neither weak KÅ'nigâs lemma nor the fan theorem is a consequence of just logical axioms or just choice-like axioms assumed in constructive logic, it seems likely that CT is inconsistent only with a combination of classical logic and choice axioms. We study consequences of CT and its relation to several classes of axioms in Coqâs type theory, a constructive type theory with a universe of propositions which proves neither classical logical axioms nor strong choice axioms. We thereby provide a partial answer to the question as to which axioms may preserve computational intuitions inherent to type theory, and which certainly do not. The paper can also be read as a broad survey of axioms in type theory, with all results mechanised in the Coq proof assistant.
