期刊名称：Ovidius University Annals: Economic Sciences Series
电子版ISSN：2393-3127
出版年度：2012
卷号：12
期号：2
语种：English
出版社：Ovidius University Press
摘要：The firms have different behaviors on the real market. Starting from these ideas the present paper intends to identify the main explanatory elements that show the evolution of the firm. We study the effect of time delays in evolutionary games with one population of users and two strategies. The case where the delays,corresponding to different strategies,are not the same is considered. The local stability of the stationary state for the replicator dynamics is analyzed. The stochastic evolutionary game with delay is taken into consideration. The last part of the paper includes numerical simulations and conclusions.
关键词：dynamics games;evolutionary games;equilibrium conditions;stability conditions;delayed differential evolutionary games
