摘要：Economic Analysis of Law (Law and Economic) starts from the assumption that the target of legal norms is to enable efficient resource allocation. The phenomenon of ecological costs as a part of negative externalities leads to inefficiency. The government is expected to create an institutional framework that will provide internalization of all costs,in order to succeed optimal economic behavior of all parties. One of the methods to reach the goal is by agreement of interested parties,contained in the 'Coase Theorem'. The first article is about ecological cost as a part of negative externalities and a way it leads to deviation of optimal economic behavior. Afterwards,the basic assumptions about internalization of external cost through agreement of interested parties are exposed. Then the specifics of ecological cost as a part of externalities are shown,which only in some cases leads to an agreement that provides optimal results. At the end,the possibility of contamination licenses market is discussed,where in certain circumstances the achievement of optimal behavior of all parties could be expected through their mutual coordination and exchange of resources they possess.
其他摘要：Економска анализа права полази од претпоставке да је циљ правних норми да омогући ефикасну алокацију ресурса. Појава еколошких трошкова као једног вида негативних екстерналија,доводи до појаве неефикасности. Од државе се очекује да створи институционални
