标题：A wonderful analogy between Augustine’s definition of moral-value- functional sense of response-action and Philo’s definition of truth-functional sense of implication in logic
摘要：The paper is devoted to interdisciplinary research at the intersection of symbolic logic, mathematical ethics, and philosophical theology. By comparing definitions of relevant functions, a surprising analogy is discovered between the well-known Philo’s precise definition of implication in logic (classical one) and Augustine’s precise definition of God’s morally good reaction to human actions. The moral-value-table-representation of Augustinian doctrine is compared with moral-value-table-representations of Pelagius’ and Leo Tolstoy’s views of adequate moral-response-actions.
关键词：Philo definition of truth functional sense of implication in logic; Augustinian definition of moral value functional sense of response action; Leo Tolstoy; Pelagius; two valued algebra of formal axiology.
其他关键词：La definición filónica del significado verdadero funcional de la implicación en la lógica; definición agustiniana de significado moral funcional de la acción de respuesta; Leo Tolstoi; Pelagio; álgebra de axiología formal de dos valo
