摘要：Abstract Human Theory of Mind (ToM) is so automatic and pervasive that we spontaneously attribute mental states to animated abstract shapes, as evidenced by the classic Heider–Simmel findings. The extent to which this represents a fundamental characteristic of primate social cognition is debated. Prior research suggests that monkeys spontaneously predict behavior and attribute basic goals to conspecifics, but it remains unclear whether, like humans, they spontaneously ascribe mental states to animated shapes. Here, we address this question by analyzing rhesus monkeys’ viewing patterns of the classic Heider–Simmel animations. We hypothesized that if rhesus monkeys also spontaneously attribute mental states to animated shapes, then, like humans, they would have the longest fixation durations for theory of mind animations, medium duration fixation for goal-directed animations, and shortest fixations for animations with random motion. In contrast, if attributing mental states to animations is specific to humans and perhaps other apes, then we predict no differences in looking time across animation categories. Unlike humans, monkeys did not fixate longer on ToM videos. Critically, monkeys’ viewing patterns did not correlate with humans’ viewing patterns or intentionality ratings from previously published research. The only major difference in viewing patterns between animation categories tracked differences in low-level visual motion. Thus, monkeys do not view the classic Heider–Simmel animations like humans do and we found no evidence that they spontaneously attribute mental states to animated shapes.
其他摘要：Abstract Human Theory of Mind (ToM) is so automatic and pervasive that we spontaneously attribute mental states to animated abstract shapes, as evidenced by the classic Heider–Simmel findings. The extent to which this represents a fundamental characteristic of primate social cognition is debated. Prior research suggests that monkeys spontaneously predict behavior and attribute basic goals to conspecifics, but it remains unclear whether, like humans, they spontaneously ascribe mental states to animated shapes. Here, we address this question by analyzing rhesus monkeys’ viewing patterns of the classic Heider–Simmel animations. We hypothesized that if rhesus monkeys also spontaneously attribute mental states to animated shapes, then, like humans, they would have the longest fixation durations for theory of mind animations, medium duration fixation for goal-directed animations, and shortest fixations for animations with random motion. In contrast, if attributing mental states to animations is specific to humans and perhaps other apes, then we predict no differences in looking time across animation categories. Unlike humans, monkeys did not fixate longer on ToM videos. Critically, monkeys’ viewing patterns did not correlate with humans’ viewing patterns or intentionality ratings from previously published research. The only major difference in viewing patterns between animation categories tracked differences in low-level visual motion. Thus, monkeys do not view the classic Heider–Simmel animations like humans do and we found no evidence that they spontaneously attribute mental states to animated shapes.
