摘要：Agency problems are created as a result of the conflict of interests that exists between managers and shareholders. Auditing is considered as an effective way to limit the powers of managers in contractual relationships. In this paper, the aim is to test the market response to the quality of audit partners. For this purpose, the data of the listed companies in the Tehran Stock Exchange for the period 2009 to 2017 have been extracted and the regression model of cross-sectional data has been used to test the research hypothesis. The results of the first hypothesis of the research confirm that in companies with high quality audit partners, revenues have a higher reflection in stock prices. The high quality of the audit partner's work manages and controls the amount of information asymmetry and, therefore, the agency's problems related to the company's management decisions. The second hypothesis, entitled changing the auditor and selecting a higher quality auditor, leads to a positive market reaction has also been confirmed if the market believes that the information content of profits increases with the use of high quality auditors, as well as abnormal returns. The audit market response when changing auditors and selecting a higher quality auditing partner is closer to reality (predicted levels). Also, the results of the third hypothesis that auditing by high quality auditing partners has a significant impact on the amount of facilities received, has been confirmed. Because the quality of the audit partners 'work has a significant impact on the creditors' view of the risk and timing of the repayment of receivables, the amount of facilities granted therefore increases. On the other hand, the stock price in these companies is a reflection of the real income of these companies.
