摘要：Using the 2014 China Banking Regulatory Commission (CBRC) credit control policy as a quasi-natural experiment, this paper demonstrates that credit supply contraction leads to a significant reduction in firm’s external funding, cash holding, and investment. Analysis of both loan-level and corporate-level data reveal that new bank loans issuance of targeted firms dropped significantly after the regulation. State-owned banks are identified as the main policy implementer. By instrumenting the change of loans issuance with the policy shock, I further discover the amplifying effect of large declines in bond issuance and trade credit for the targeted firms. Cash holdings were used to cushion the financing gap. Investment dropped and inefficient investment increased due to the shock. Interestingly, whereas such impacts were significant for non-state owned enterprises, state-owned enterprises (SOEs) were barely affected. Overall, I conclude that the lending control policy led to less capital resources allocated to non-SOEs but not SOEs.
