其他摘要：Ludwig Landgrebe’s philosophical inquiries are undoubtedly situated in the wake of Husserlian phenomenology. However, this conceptual framework is not simply taken for granted: Landgrebe reenacts Husserl’s fundamental analysis, pursues his thrust, extends his bearings, and widens his aims. Furthermore, the straightforward assumption of the phenomenological method does not induce him to adopt a narrow form of orthodoxy. As early as 1940, while he takes up the task of elaborating a phenomenological concept of world, Landgrebe offers a critical account of Husserl’s position, thus rejecting any identification between the theoretical program inaugurated by Husserl and the letter of his writings: “In the future, anyone who proposes to clarify the concept ‘world’ should first become acquainted with Husserl’s results, see their presuppositions and their limits, and come to terms with them.”2 In what follows, I aim to reconstruct the main tenets of Landgrebe’s attempt at “coming to terms” with the limitations he detects in Husserl’s concept of world and to make clear its enduring relevance for contemporary discussions. As it will appear, this criticism moves in a double direction and involves a commitment to two seemingly competing requirements: that of radicalizing the transcendental-constitutive perspective beyond what Husserl has accomplished in his writings; and that of providing a theoretical space for what resists a transcendental-constitutive account, i.e., for a dimension of archi-facticity upon which any constitutive inquiry ultimately rests.
