期刊名称：International Journal of Distributed Sensor Networks
印刷版ISSN：1550-1329
电子版ISSN：1550-1477
出版年度：2019
卷号：15
期号：9
页码：1
DOI：10.1177/1550147719875651
出版社：Hindawi Publishing Corporation
摘要：In mobile ad hoc networks, network nodes accomplish a target task usually by cooperative packet forwarding from the source to the destination. It is a challenge to enforce their mutual cooperation for a node’s self-interest. In this article, we focus on cooperative packet forwarding in a one-hop unreliable channel, which leads to packet loss and retransmission. We model the process of packet forwarding with the nodes’ remaining energy and reputation value. We propose a packet-forwarding non-cooperative game model reflecting the utilities of different packet-forwarding strategies, in which an incentive mechanism is introduced to enforce cooperation of packet forwarding. Furthermore, we analyze the packet-forwarding game with replicator dynamics and derive and prove three theorems. If the conditions of the theorems are met, the evolutionarily stable strategies can be attained. Three inferences also reveal how convergence speed to evolutionarily stable states is affected by the cooperative incentive, the probability of successful packet transmissions, and the upper limit of the retransmission number. The simulation results support the proposed theorems and inferences. In addition, we show that our game model with a reputation value and the mechanism of incentive cooperation can improve the probability of successful packet transmissions, and reduce the network overhead.
关键词：Packet forwarding; unreliable channels; evolutionary game; evolutionarily stable strategy; mobile ad hoc networks
其他关键词：Packet forwarding ; unreliable channels ; evolutionary game ; evolutionarily stable strategy ; mobile ad hoc networks
