出版社：Ljubljana University Press, Faculty of Arts (Znanstvena založba Filozofske fakultete Univerze v Ljubljani)
摘要：A textual difference exists between 2A6 and 6A6 of the Mengzi: In 2A6, the heart-mind of ceyin (compassion), xiuwu (shame), cirang (courtesy and modesty), and shifei (moral judgement) are said to be the four “duan” (germs) of ren (humaneness), yi (optimal appropriateness), li (observance of the rites), and zhi (wisdom), whereas in 6A6, the term “duan” is not found. For this reason, some scholars today criticize the interpretation that translates “duan” as “starting point”, which implies a substantial difference between the four germs and ren, yi, li, and zhi that apparently does not exist in 6A6. Instead, these scholars prefer another interpretation that takes “duan” as an indication of the essential sameness between the four germs and ren, yi, li, and zhi that are originally possessed by a morally perfect heart-mind. This essay re-evaluates these two interpretations. First, it argues that compared to the frst, the second interpretation’s argument for a morally perfect heart-mind is less compatible with the nature of Mengzi’s moral philosophy as a teaching that focuses on self-introspection and moral cultivation in experience. Second, this essay reinforces the frst interpretation by demonstrating the existence of two different senses of ren (as well as yi, li, and zhi) in the Mengzi, thus allowing it to coherently suggest that the heart-mind possessing the four germs as innate moral feelings is the same as the “relatively antecedent” ren, which is, at the same time, the starting point for developing the “relatively consequent” ren that is substantially different from the former.
其他摘要：Med odsekoma 2A6 in 6A6 knjige Mencij je naslednja tekstualna razlika: V odseku 2A6 je srce-razum, ki goji ceyin (sočutje), xiuwu (sram), cirang (vljudnost in zmernost) in shifei (moralno presojo), obravnavan kot štiri »duan« (kali) vrlin, tj. ren (človečnost), yi (optimalna primernost), li (upoštevanje obredov) in zhi (modrost). V odseku 6A6 pa pojma »duan« ni mogoče najti. Zato danes nekateri strokovnjaki kritizirajo interpretacijo, v kateri je pojem »duan« preveden kot »izhodišče«, kar implicira bistveno razliko med štirimi kalmi ter ren, yi, li in zhi, ki pa v 6A6 očitno ne obstaja. Namesto tega so ti strokovnjaki veliko bolj naklonjeni razlagi, po kateri je »duan« označba za bistveno enakost štirih kali ter ren, yi, li in zhi, ki jih izvorno poseduje moralno izpopolnjen srce-razum. Ta esej ponovno ovrednoti ti dve interpretaciji. Prvič, članek zagovarja stališče, da je v primerjavi s prvo argument druge razlage za moralno popoln srce-razum manj skladen z naravo Mencijeve moralne flozofje kot nauka, ki se osredotoča na izkušenjsko samointrospekcijo in moralno kultivacijo. Drugič, ta esej podpre drugo razlago s ponazoritvijo obstoja dveh različnih pomenov pojma ren (kot tudi yi, li in zhi) v delu Mencij. S tem pa dopušča, da ta koherentno kaže, da je srce-razum, ki poseduje štiri kali kot ponotranjena moralna občutja, enak »relativno predhodni« vrlini ren in je hkrati izhodiščna točka razvoja »relativno posledične« ren, ki pa se občutno razlikuje od prejšnje.
