摘要：The main objective of this article is to demonstrate why establishing the criterion of reason responsiveness is only a necessary condition for the successful (in both moral and epistemological terms) implementation of telepresence robots as moral prompters (reasoners). By extrapolating the use of Kantian and utilitarian first-order normative theories to the field of machine ethics, I examine why some of the main difficulties in arguing for such moral prompters – consequently, for the development of telepresence robots as potential moral advisers and moral observers – derive from the fact that their application raises some significant moral dilemmas which go beyond the field of machine ethics as such. Clarifying why those dilemmas are unsolvable, I try to demonstrate why not only strong, but also weak ‘moral’ AI scenarios require further investigation.
关键词：machine ethics;moral epistemology;Kantian and utilitarian first-order normative theories;telepresence robots
